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In 1822, decades before any state was willing to pass a general
incorporation act, New York and Connecticut enacted our country's
first limited partnership statutes.1 Based on the French Societe en
Commandite, the limited partnership acts authorized the creation of
partnerships with two classes of "partners," general and limited. The
basic approach was the same as today's. General partners were what
we normally think of as partners, persons with full power to run the
business who are unlimitedly personally liable to its contract and tort
creditors. Limited partners, on the other hand, were passive investors
who could lose their protected status as limited partners if they took
part in the control of the business. In short, if the limited partners
were truly passive investors, and if they followed a statutorily pre-
scribed procedure for publicly recording their status as passive inves-
tors, they would be insulated from personal liability to the creditors
of the partnership. Although limited partnership statutes spread, in-
terest in limited partnerships began to fade as the corporate form
became more freely available.
In 1916, in a period of relative dormancy of the limited partner-
ship, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act2 ("Original
Act"), which was subsequently adopted by virtually every state, in-
cluding Florida.3 For decades thereafter, the limited partnership re-
mained a relatively insignificant form of business association. By the
early 1960's, however, it had become clear that limited partnerships
were being classified as partnerships for federal income tax purposes.
Limited partners were offered limited liability similar to that availa-
ble in the corporate form, minus the corporate income tax, plus the
t01986 by Donald J. Weidner.
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1. H. REUSCHLEIN AND IV. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 434 n.54 (1979).
2. Unif. Limited Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 561.
3. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.01 et seq.
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"pass through" of tax losses available to those who are classified as
partners for federal income tax purposes.4 Because of this attractive
combination of advantages, limited partnerships began to proliferate,
particularly in depreciable real estate.
In 1976, the Uniform Commissioners replaced the bare-bones
Original Act with a new act (the "1976 Act"). Although the 1976 Act
was generally viewed as an improvement, it was a far from perfect
updating of the statutory foundation for a form of business organiza-
tion that had exploded in currency and come to be used in a wide
range of sophisticated transactions involving many investors and
large sums of money.5 In 1985, prior to issuing their customary Offi-
cial Comment, the Uniform Commissioners issued the latest version
of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the "Uniform Act").
In June of 1986, the Florida Legislature focused on the unprece-
dented significance of limited partnerships in Florida. The Staff of
the House Commerce Committee reported that there are currently
12,110 limited partnerships, both domestic and foreign, registered to
transact business in Florida and that an estimated 3,000 new limited
partnerships will register this year.7 It also noted that limited part-
nerships often involve many more limited partners than was antici-
pated at the time of the Original Act, and are used to finance a wide
variety of ventures of unprecedented complexity. In addition, experi-
ence elsewhere had indicated the need for a wide range of new provi-
sions, including those designed to clarify and fortify the basic limited
liability of limited partners." Accordingly, the Legislature completely
4. For a discussion of the basic consequences of being classified as a partnership for federal
income tax purposes, see Weidner, The Existence of State and Tax Partnerships: A Primer, 11
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1, 26-40 (1983). The Florida Legislature perceived itself as regulating a form
of business organization characterized by its combination of limited liability and partnership
tax classification. See Staff Analysis of CS/HB 347, Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Commit-
tee on Commerce, Florida House of Representatives 2 (April 21, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
"Commerce Staff Report"]: "It is a plain fact that but for this tax flow-through characteristic of
limited partnerships, many risky yet socially desirable projects, would not be undertaken."
5. The 1976 Act is published, together with Official Comment, at 6 U.L.A. 201 (1986
Supp.). See generally Comment, Revising Ohio's Limited Partnership Law, 54 U. Cm. L. REV.
271 (1985).
6. The Uniform Act appears in the 1986 Supplement to 6 U.L.A., accompanied by a note
that states that "the prefatory note and comments have not yet been approved." 1986 Supp. at
284. The author is informed by a Commissioner that internal concerns over appropriate style
have delayed the Commissioners from issuing the "prefatory note and comments" with the text
of the Uniform Act.
7. Commerce Staff Report, supra note 4, at 10.
8. See authority cited infra note 116.
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scrapped Florida's existing limited partnership act, which was based
on the Original Act, and replaced it with a new statute (the "new
Florida Act"), which is based on the Uniform Act. The new Florida
Act provides that it is to be construed to make uniform the law of
limited partnerships among the states adopting the Uniform Act.'
The purpose of this article is to explain and evaluate the provisions
of the new Florida Act that determine the limited liability of limited
partners.
II. FORMATION AND FAILURE TO FILE
A. The Certificate Requirement and Point of Formation
The new Florida Act states that a limited partnership is "a part-
nership formed by two or more persons under the laws of this state
and having one or more general partners and one or more limited
partners." 10 It further provides that a limited partnership is formed
at the time of the filing of the certificate of limited partnership with
the Department of State or at any later time specified in the certifi-
cate of limited partnership if, in either case, there has been substan-
tial compliance with the requirements of this section [8]."
The requirements of section eight are simply that a certificate must
be executed and filed with the Department of State setting forth the
name and mailing address of the limited partnership, the address of
an office where required records are kept and the name and address
of an agent for service of process, the name and business address of
each general partner and the latest date upon which the limited part-
nership is to dissolve. 12 The certificate must be accompanied by an
affidavit declaring the amount of the capital contributions of the lim-
ited partners and the amount anticipated to be contributed by the
limited partners.'3
There are two basic issues that are interrelated but must be dis-
9. New Florida Act § 68(1), Commerce Staff Report, supra note 4, at 9. The New Florida
Act to date only appears as 1986 Fla. Laws 86-263.
10. New Florida Act § 2(7). This is the same definition for "domestic limited partnership."
New Florida Act § 2(4) defines "foreign limited partnership" as "a partnership formed by two
or more persons under the laws of any state other than this state and having as partners one or
more general partners and one or more limited partners."
11. New Florida Act § 8(2).
12. New Florida Act § 8(1). New Florida Act § 8(1)(f) indicates that the general partners
may decide to include other matters in the certificate.
13. New Florida Act § 8(1).
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tinguished. One, has a limited partnership been formed notwith-
standing the failure to file a certificate? Two, if a limited partnership
has not been formed, are the would-be limited partners automatically
liable as general partners? 4
With respect to the first issue, the new Florida Act makes it
much more difficult to argue that a limited partnership has been
formed notwithstanding the failure to file a certificate. Prior deci-
sions had split on the issue. Some courts assumed that no limited
partnership could exist until a certificate was filed.15 Others empha-
sized that the Original Act does not state precisely when a certificate
must be filed or when in relation to its filing the limited partnership
begins.16 The latter approach seems to be superceded by the provi-
sion in the new Florida Act that the limited partnership is formed
"at the time of the filing of the certificate" or "at any later time spec-
ified in the certificate."17 On the other hand, it still seems possible to
argue that the purpose of the filing is simply to provide notice, and if
creditors have actual notice that they are dealing with a limited part-
nership, they should not be permitted to rely on the fortuity of a
failure to file to assert nonformation and thereby achieve a windfall1 s
With respect to the second issue, there is no policy reason to
assume that would-be limited partners automatically become liable
as general partners if no limited partnership is formed.'9 Indeed, the
14. Another question that could be raised is whether the "substantial compliance" test of
the new Florida Act is to be applied at the partnership level or at the level of each individual
partner. Cf. Franklin v. Rigg, 237 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga.App. 1977), which emphasized that "the
general tenor of the [Original Act] is remedial and drawn with the purpose of protecting inves-
tors where there is a substantial compliance on their part."
15. See, e.g., Dwinell's Central Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel, 587 P.2d 191 (Wash.
App. 1978).
16. Section 2(2) of the Original Act provided that a limited partnership "is formed if there
has been substantial compliance in good faith" with the requirement to sign, swear to and file a
certificate. 6 U.L.A. at 568. In Franklin v. Rigg, 237 S.E.2d 526, 527 (Ga. App. 1977), the court
said the Original Act "is admittedly vague as to the time when the existence of the partnership
commences." Although FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.02(2) (1985) differs from § 2(2) of the Original
Act, it, too, fails to specify when a limited partnership comes into existence.
17. New Florida Act § 8(2).
18. See Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978): "We hold, there-
fore, that where a party has knowledge that the entity with which he is dealing is a limited
partnership, that status is not changed by failing to file." Cf. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v.
Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), in which the court found a "de facto" limited
partnership notwithstanding the failure to make mandatory filings after initial formation.
19. But see Dwinell's Central Neon v. Cosmopolitan Chinook Hotel, 587 P.2d 191 (Wash.
App. 1978), which seems to assume that if no limited partnership has been formed, the would-
be limited partners automatically become general partners.
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drafters of the Original Act stated to the contrary:
The limited partner not being in any sense a principal in the busi-
ness, failure to comply with the requirements of the act in respect to
the certificate, while it may result in the nonformation of the associ-
ation, does not make him a partner or liable as such.
20
Thus, even under the Original Act, the would-be limited partner
whose certificate has not been filed must fall within the usual defini-
tion of "partner" before he can be burdened with personal liability.
21
There is nothing in the new Florida Act that indicates any increased
exposure of would-be limited partners. Indeed, the new Florida Act
provisions that give limited partners additional protection from lia-
bility for becoming active in the business suggest just the opposite.22
Furthermore, now that limited partners need not even be named in
the certificate, it makes even less sense to make them automatically
personally liable simply because it has not been filed.23
The certificate required by the new Florida Act is dramatically
different from the certificate required under prior law. Prior law re-
quired that the certificate disclose the names and places of residence
of the limited partners, together with their agreed-upon contribu-
tions, the time when those contributions were to be returned, the
share of profits or other compensation by way of income which each
limited partner was to receive, and the right, if any, of the partners
to admit additional limited partners.2 4 In short, the certificate re-
quired disclosure of who the general and limited partners were and
might be and what the limited partners invested and were promised
in return. Under the new Florida Act, the certificate need not even
name the limited partners. Most of the disclosure required under the
new Florida Act is made outside the certificate itself.
A major component of the new disclosure provisions benefits the
limited partners themselves. These provisions recognize that limited
partners, like other purchasers of securities, may be best served by
full disclosure that is often difficult to obtain if it is not required by
law.25 Consequently, the certificate must direct its reader to the office
20. Original Act § 1, Official Comment, 6 U.L.A. at 564.
21. See Unif. Partnership Act § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. at 22; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.585(1) (1985).
22. See the discussion of new Florida Act § 25, text accompanying notes 84-111, infra.
23. See infra note 21 and accompanying text for a discussion of § 6 of the new Florida Act.
24. Original Act § 2(1)(a), 6 U.L.A. at 568; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.02(1)(a) (1985).
25. See also new Florida Act § 51, authorizing limited partners to bring derivative actions
on behalf of limited partnerships.
1986]
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where certain records must be kept.2 Those records include the
names and addresses of all partners, separately identifying general
and limited, the certificate and any amendments,2 1 copies of any fed-
eral, state and local partnership income tax returns and reports for
the three most recent years, and copies of the current written part-
nership agreements and any partnership financial statements for the
three most recent years.28 In addition, if not contained in a written
partnership agreement, the office must keep a written statement of:
1. The amount of cash and a description and statement of the
agreed value of the other property or services contributed by each
partner and which each partner has agreed to contribute;
2. The times at which or events on the happening of which any
additional contributions agreed to be made by each partner are to
be made;
3. Any right of a partner to receive distributions, or of a general
partner to make distributions to a partner, that include a return of
all or any part of the partner's contribution; and
4. Any events upon the happening of which the limited partner-
ship is to be dissolved and its affairs wound up.29
These records are subject to inspection and copying "at the reasona-
ble request, and at the expense, of any partner." 30
Other disclosure requirements are more directly for the benefit
of law enforcement officials. In addition to giving its records office
address, the certificate must also state the name and address of the
agent for service of process on the limited partnership. 1 Detailed in-
formation must be provided by the registered agent if he is served a
subpoena by the Department of Legal Affairs.2 This requirement
was added at the request of the Attorney General's office to help
"discover who the investors in the limited partnership are and to
have subpoena power over them."33
26. New Florida Act § 5(1).
27. Executed copies of any powers of attorney pursuant to which any certificate was exe-
cuted must also be kept. New Florida Act § 6(1)(b).
28. New Florida Act § 6(1)(a)-(d).
29. New Florida Act § 6(1)(e).
30. New Florida Act § 6(2).
31. New Florida Act §§ 5(2) and 8(1)(b).
32. New Florida Act § 73(3).
33. Commerce Staff Report, supra note 4, at 3. Compare similar provisions in the Florida
General Corporation Act at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.325 (1985).
118 [Vol. XVI
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B. The Proper Limited Partner
A limited partner is "a person who has been admitted to a lim-
ited partnership as a limited partner in accordance with the partner-
ship agreement. ' 34 Once the certificate is filed, the agreement of the
parties controls the point at which a person becomes a limited part-
ner. The new Florida Act provides that a person becomes a limited
partner on the date the original certificate is filed or the date stated
in the records of the limited partnership, whichever is later. 5 Once a
person becomes a limited partner, he will not become liable as a gen-
eral partner unless his name is improperly used or unless he takes
part in the control of the business.3 If the limited partnership is
properly formed and operated, the limited partner's sole obligation is
to make the contribution he promised to the partnership.
There are two striking features of the new Florida Act concern-
ing the limited partner's liability to make the contribution he prom-
ised. First, a promise by a limited partner to contribute to his part-
nership "is not enforceable unless it is set out in a writing signed by
the limited partner. 37 Second, the new Florida Act differs radically
from the present law's firm policy that the contribution of a limited
partner "may be cash or other property, but not services." 38 It ex-
pressly provides that the contribution of a partner "may be in cash,
property, or services rendered, or a promissory note or other obliga-
tion to contribute cash or property or to perform services."3 9 Unless
the partnership agreement provides to the contrary, every partner
must honor his promise to contribute cash, property, or services,
"even if he is unable to perform because of his death or disability or
any other reason. '40 If he does not perform, the partnership has the
option to require him to contribute cash in an amount equal to the
stated value of the contribution that remains to be made.4' Unless
provided otherwise in the partnership agreement, the obligation of a
34. New Florida Act § 2(6).
35. New Florida Act § 24.
36. See the discussion of § 25 of the new Florida Act, infra note 84 and accompanying text.
37. New Florida Act § 30(1).
38. Original Act § 4, 6 U.L.A. at 579; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.04 (1985).
39. New Florida Act § 29. See also new Florida Act § 2(2), which defines "contribution" to
include "any cash, property, or services rendered, or a promissory note or other obligation to
contribute cash or property or to perform services, which a partner contributes to a limited
partnership in his capacity as a partner."
40. New Florida Act § 30(2).
41. Id.
1986]
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partner to contribute may be compromised only by consent of all the
partners.42 However, a creditor "who extends credit or otherwise acts
in reliance on that obligation after the partner has signed a writing
that indicates the obligation and before the amendment or cancella-
tion of the writing" may enforce it. 43 As the Commerce Staff Report
explains:
Since this bill allows contributions in the form of promises to render
services, provisions were added so that a partner who is unable to
perform those services would be required to pay the cash value of
the services unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise or
the other business partners consent to a compromise. However, re-
gardless of the compromise, if a creditor extends credit in reliance
on that obligation and the partner has signed a writing that recog-
nizes the obligation, that creditor may enforce the original
obligation. 44
C. The Person Erroneously Believing Himself a Limited Partner
Section 26 of the new Florida Act contains a completely new and
much expanded provision concerning the liability of a person errone-
ously believing himself to be a limited partner. Given that one be-
comes a limited partner on the later of the date the certificate is filed
or the date stated in the records of the limited partnership,45 this
provision will only apply to a very limited class of situations. Prior
case law had already established that its predecessor was confined to
defective formation situations,4 and there is nothing in the new Flor-
42. New Florida Act § 30(3).
43. Id.
44. Commerce Staff Report, supra note 4, at 5. See also id. at 6:
Similarly, under section 30, the partnership agreement may provide that the in-
terest of any partner who fails to make any contribution that he is obligated to make
shall be subject to penalties as set forth in the partnership agreement. Such penalties
may include reducing the defaulting partner's proportionate interest in the limited
partnership, subordinating his interest to that of nondefaulting partners, forcing sale,
redemption, or forfeiture of his partnership interest at a formulated price, etc.
45. New Florida Act § 24(1).
46. See Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964):
The [erroneous belief followed by prompt renunciation] section of our statute is
a part of the uniform limited partnership act, having application to those situations
where, because of a failure to comply with the statute, the limited partnership never
comes into existence .... [T]his section ... is not applicable to the situation ...
where the limited partnership was validly formed, but subsequently lost its status as
such for its failure to comply with the requirements of the statute regarding payment
of annual fee and securing a renewal certificate of authority to do business as a lim-
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ida Act that indicates that the new section 26 is to have any broader
applicability:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who makes a
contribution to a business enterprise and erroneously but in good
faith believes that he has become a limited partner in the enterprise
is not a general partner in the enterprise and is not bound by its
obligations by reason of making the contribution, receiving distribu-
tions from the enterprise, or exercising any rights of a limited part-
ner, if within a reasonable time after ascertaining the mistake, he:
(a) Causes an appropriate certificate of limited partnership or a
certificate of amendment to be executed and filed; or
(b) Withdraws from future equity participation in the enter-
prise by executing and filing with the Department of State a certifi-
cate declaring withdrawal under this section.
(2) A person who makes a contribution of the kind described in
subsection (1) is liable as a general partner to any third party who
transacts business with the enterprise before the person withdraws
and an appropriate certificate is filed to show withdrawal or before
an appropriate certificate is filed to show that the person is not a
general partner, but in either case only if the third party actually
believed in good faith that the person was a general partner at the
time of the transaction.47
This new provision is essentially the same as the Uniform Act
except that the latter does not expressly give the would-be limited
partner "a reasonable time" after ascertaining the mistake."" It
changes existing Florida law in several important respects. First, it
adds the requirement that the erroneous belief in limited partner sta-
tus must be "in good faith. '49 Second, it provides the limited partner
with the alternative of curing the defect by causing an appropriate
certificate of amendment to be filed or withdrawing "from future eq-
ited partnership .... It would thus appear that even though the limited partnership
involved in this case lost its right to operate as such because of its failure to make its
annual report and secure the renewal certificate of authority. . . , such loss of status
did not automatically convert appellee's status to one of a general partner as a matter
of law. The legal character of the partnership ceased to continue as a de jure limited
partnership, but became a de facto limited partnership .... The partnership's loss
of legal status as a de jure limited partnership therefore did not automatically con-
vert appellee's legal relationship to that of a general partner in the business.
Id. at 764.
47. New Florida Act § 26.
48. Uniform Act § 304, 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.).
49. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.11 (1985), referring only to the person "erroneously
believing that he had become a limited partner. ... "
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uity participation" by filing a certificate of withdrawal. This refer-
ence to "future equity participation" is intended to make clear that
the person who chooses to withdraw in order to protect himself from
personal liability is not required to renounce his then current interest
in the partnership.50 Finally, the new provision preserves general lia-
bility with respect to any third party who transacts business with the
enterprise before the investor takes his curative action, provided the
third party believed in good faith that the investor was a general
partner.51
III. LIABILITY FOR FALSE STATEMENT IN CERTIFICATE
One possible foundation for establishing the personal liability of
a limited partner has been a false statement in the certificate. The
Original Act provided that anyone suffering a loss by reliance on a
false statement in a certificate could hold liable any party to the cer-
tificate who knew the statement to be false at the time he signed the
certificate, or, subsequently, but within a sufficient time before the
statement was relied upon to enable him to take curative action. 2
The new Florida Act elevates the reliance requirement a plaintiff
must prove to "reasonable reliance."5 " More basically, the fact that
limited partners and their contributions are no longer required to be
listed in the certificate suggests that they are no longer among those
who "execute" the certificate. This would explain why the basic sec-
tion on "liability of limited partner to third parties, '54 which dis-
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.11 (1985) vaguely required the withdrawing person to renounce
"his interest in the profits of the business or other compensation by way of income." The Uni-
form Commissioners first added the language of "future equity participation" in § 304(a) of the
1976 Act, which Florida never adopted. Their Official Comment to the 1976 Act explains the
provision, in part, as follows:
The provisions. . . are intended to clarify an ambiguity in the prior law by providing
that a person who chooses to withdraw from the enterprise in order to protect himself
from liability is not required to renounce any of his then current interest in the enter-
prise so long as he has no further participation as an equity participant.
6 U.L.A. at 244 (1986 Supp.).
51. Delaware's version of this provision protects only a third party who relies on the credit
of the would-be limited partner. The third party who transacts business with the partnership
before timely curative action is taken may recover only if he "actually believed in good faith
that such person was a general partner at the time of the transaction, acted in reasonable reli-
ance on such belief and extended credit to the partnership in reasonable reliance on the credit
of such person." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-304(b)(2) (1985 Interim Supp.).
52. Original Act § 6, 6 U.L.A. at 581; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.06 (1985).
53. New Florida Act § 15.
54. New Florida Act § 25.
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cusses both the improper use of a limited partner's surname and the
exercise of control by a limited partner, makes no mention of limited
partner liability for a false statement in a certificate. Stated differ-
ently, the new Florida Act provision on liability for a false statement
in the certificate seems aimed almost exclusively at general partners.
Section 15 of the new Florida Act provides that one who suffers
loss by "reasonable reliance" on a false statement in the certificate
may recover damages from:
(1) Any person who executed the certificate, or caused another
to execute it on his behalf, and knew, and any general partner who
knew or should have known, the statement to be false at the time
the certificate was executed; and
(2) Any general partner who thereafter knows or should have
known that any arrangement or other fact described in the certifi-
cate has changed, making the statement inaccurate in any material
respect, within a sufficient time before the statement was relied
upon reasonably to have enabled that general partner to cancel or
amend the certificate or to file a petition for its cancellation or
amendment under section 13.55
This provision of the new Florida Act is essentially the same as the
Uniform Act, except that: (a) it specifies that the reliance must be
"reasonable;" and (b) it provides that liability because of a changed
fact must be based on a statement that is inaccurate in some "mate-
rial" respect.56
The basic question is whether a limited partner is a "person who
executed the certificate, or caused another to execute it on his be-
half." Because limited partners no longer need be named in the cer-
tificate, it would seem that a limited partner is not generally a person
who either executes a certificate or causes another to execute it on his
behalf.57 It would seem that the person executing the certificate
should generally be viewed as executing it on behalf of the partner-
ship as an entity, leaving only the general partners personally liable
and not the limited partners who need not even be named. On the
other hand, under the new Florida Act limited partners can receive
55. New Florida Act § 15.
56. Compare Uniform Act § 207, 6 U.L.A. at 289 (1986 Supp.).
57. This basic question may be answered when the Official Comment to the Uniform Act is
published. See supra note 6. See also the Official Comment to the antecedent of Uniform Act §
207, 1976 Act § 207, which refers to "providing explicitly for the liability of persons who sign a
certificate as agent under a power of attorney and ... confining the obligation to amend a
certificate ... in light of future events to a general partner." 6 U.L.A. at 237 (1986 Supp.).
1986]
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their interests for services and can assume many of the responsibili-
ties of the partnership business.59 To the extent their responsibilities
include preparing and filing the certificate, they presumably can be
people who execute the certificate for purposes of section 15.
IV. IMPROPER USE OF SURNAME
Even prior to the Original Act, a limited partner could lose his
limited liability if his name was improperly used in the partnership
name. The basic idea is that those who permit their names to be used
in partnership names should be treated as if they realize that the use
of a name inevitably suggests liability as a principal. The new Florida
Act continues this basic policy by providing that the name of the
limited partnership"0 may not contain the name of a limited partner
unless:
(a) That name is also the name of a general partner or the cor-
porate name of a corporate general partner; or
(b) The business of the limited partnership had been carried on
under that name before the admission of that limited partner
61
If neither of these circumstances is present, a limited partner who
"knowingly permits" his name to be used in the name of the limited
partnership "is liable to creditors who extend credit to the limited
partnership without actual knowledge that the limited partner is not
a general partner. 6 2
V. THE "CONTROL" LIMITATION
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage to the limited partnership
form of doing business has been uncertainty about the "control" limi-
tation . 3 The basic differences of opinion under the Original Act must
58. New Florida Act §§ 2(2) and 29.
59. New Florida Act § 25(2).
60. Section 4 of the new Florida Act provides that the limited partnership's name may be
reserved before the limited partnership is formed.
61. New Florida Act § 3(2).
62. New Florida Act § 25(4).
63. See J. CRANE AND A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 147 (1968):
Limited partners are exempt from personal liability on condition that they do
not participate in management. There is no express bar to their participation, but the
threat of personal liability is a strong deterrent. Neither the Act nor the decisions
under it are very helpful on the critical question of how much review, advisory, man-
agement selection, or veto power a limited partner may have without being regarded
[Vol. XVI
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be understood to appreciate the significance of the provisions under
the new Florida Act.
A. Decisions under the Original Act
Section 7 of the Original Act provided that a limited partner
"shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to
the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes
part in the control of the business."64 There were two basic questions
presented by this section. First, what constitutes "control" within the
meaning of this section? It was anticipated by the drafters that lim-
ited partners would take "some degree of control over the conduct of
the business. '65 Second, what are the consequences if a limited part-
ner exercises a prohibited amount of control? Some assumed that
limited partners were automatically liable as general partners if they
took part in the control of the business. However, that is not what
the statute says; that would have been an easy thing for the drafters
to say and they chose not to. The Original Act provided that a lim-
ited partner "shall not become liable as a general partner unless...
he takes part in the control of the business." That is, the exercise of
control is a minimum requirement before a limited partner will be
deemed a general partner; the statute does not expressly state that
the mere exercise of control is sufficient. In some jurisdictions, courts
inferred that a reliance requirement must be satisfied before third
parties can establish the personal liability of limited partners on the
ground that they exercised too much control.66
as taking part in control. The resulting uncertainty is probably the greatest drawback
of the limited partnership form.
See also M. GORDON, 3 FLORIDA CORPORATIONS MANUAL § 52.14:
The Florida law does not indicate what level of management participation will
cause a limited partner to lose his limited liability status. No assistance is gained
from ULPA. Numerous cases have addressed this issue, but there is no consistent
pattern which helps in determining what level of participation is permitted by a lim-
ited partner before loss of that status. The issue has not been faced by the Florida
courts.
64. Original Act § 7, 6 U.L.A. at 582. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.07 (1985) added "or violates s.
620.05" to the end of Original Act § 7. The section referred to is the one that provides that a
limited partner's surname generally may not be used in the partnership name.
65. See text accompanying note 77 infra.
66. See Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1471 (1969).
The imposition of general liability on a limited partner who exercises control may be prospec-
tive from exercise point and not retrospective. That is, he will not necessarily be held liable as a
general partner ab initio. See Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd.,6 7 is a landmark case imposing
personal liability on limited partners on the ground that they exer-
cised control. The plaintiffs leased land to a limited partnership that
had a corporation as its only general partner and twenty-two individ-
uals as its limited partners. Three of the individual limited partners
were directors, officers and shareholders of the corporate general
partner. The lease was executed by "Fidelity Lease, Ltd., a limited
partnership acting by and through Interlease Corporation, General
Partner," 8 thus leaving no suggestion that any of the limited part-
ners was to be personally liable. Indeed, execution of the lease was a
clear statement that the limited partners were not to be personally
liable. The lease required the plaintiffs to build a restaurant, which
they did, and required the limited partnership to take possession and
pay rent, which it failed to do.
Liability was clear as to the limited partnership itself and, conse-
quently, as to the corporate general partner. However, it was also
clear that the liability of the partnership and its corporate general
partner were worthless. Initially, the plaintiffs sued all the limited
partners, apparently on the theory that no limited partnership had
been formed because a corporation cannof be the only general part-
ner in a limited partnership. The Original Act required "one or more
general partners and one or more limited partners,"6 9 and the plain-
tiffs' position was that a corporation cannot be a "legal general part-
ner." The action was dropped against the limited partners who were
not involved in the general partner and, amazingly, the court specifi-
cally declined to decide whether a corporation can ever become a "le-
gal general partner. '70 The action proceeded, and was successful,
against the three limited partners who were the directors, officers and
shareholders of the corporate general partner. The court seemed to
focus on them in their capacity as officers, and concluded both that
they had exercised an impermissible level of control, and that that
exercise resulted in their personal liability.
Delaney created an unfortunate windfall for the plaintiffs, who
had not bargained for the personal liability of the limited partners.7 1
67. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
68. Id. at 545.
69. Original Act § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
70. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
71. Compare the better-reasoned opinion of the court below:
The logical reason to hold a limited partner to general liability under the control
prohibition. . . is to prevent third parties from mistakenly assuming that the limited
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Indeed, it appears that the freedom of the limited partners from per-
sonal liability was at the essence of the bargain struck. Nevertheless,
the court repudiated the idea that reliance should be part of the
plaintiffs' case or that lack of reliance should be an affirmative de-
fense: "The statute makes no mention of any requirement of reliance
on the part of the party attempting to hold the limited partner per-
sonally liable. '72
Unhampered by any reliance requirement similar to what other
courts had found, the court concluded that the three limited partners
were liable because they had exercised control within the meaning of
Original Act section 7. They had argued that it was their corporation,
not they, who exercised the control, and that the corporate existence
should not be ignored. The court, however, ignored the existence of
the corporation, stating that "courts will disregard the corporate fic-
tion . ..where it is used to circumvent a statute." In the case of
limited partnerships, "[s]trict compliance with the statute is required
if a limited partner is to avoid liability as a general partner. 7' The
court focused on the statutory requirement that there be at least one
general partner.74 If the sole corporate general partner were not ig-
nored, "the statutory requirement of at least one general partner
with general liability in a limited partnership can be circumvented or
vitiated by limited partners operating the partnership through a cor-
poration with minimum capitalization and therefore minimum
liability. ' 75
A very different result was reached under quite similar facts in
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc.7 ' The defendants
were two limited partners who were also directors, officers and share-
holders of the corporation that was the only general partner of a lim-
ited partnership that had breached its contract. It was accepted as a
partner is a general partner and to rely on his general liability. However, it is hard to
believe that a creditor would be deceived where he knowingly deals with a general
partner which is a corporation. That in itself is a creature specifically devised to limit
liability. The fact that certain limited partners are shareholders, directors or officers
of the corporation is beside the point where the creditor is not deceived.
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd., 517 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
72. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
73. 526 S.W.2d at 546. Compare Original Act § 28(1), 6 U.L.A. at 617; FLA. STAT. ANN. §
620.28(1) (1985): "The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed shall have no application to this act."
74. Original Act § 1, 6 U.L.A. at 562.
75. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
76. 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977).
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matter of fact that the two limited partners "controlled [the corpo-
rate general partner] and through their control of [the corporate gen-
eral partner] they exercised the day-to-day control and management
of [the limited partnership]. 7 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the two limited partners were not personally
liable.
The court first made clear that it is permissible in Washington to
have a limited partnership with a corporation as the sole general
partner. The Uniform Partnership Act, which applies to limited part-
nerships absent express provision to the contrary,7 8 expressly pro-
vides that a corporation is a "person" who may become a partner.79
Because there is no express provision to the contrary, said the court,
corporations may also be partners in limited partnerships. This con-
clusion was reinforced by a Washington provision that anticipated a
vote by the limited partners on the "transfer of a majority of the
voting stock of a corporate general partner."80 The court distin-
guished Delaney on the ground that the corporation and the limited
partnership were set up contemporaneously, and the sole purpose of
the corporation was to operate the limited partnership. The Delaney
court was concerned that the limited partners who controlled the cor-
poration were obligated to operate the corporation for the benefit of
the partnership.
This is not the case here. The pattern of operation of [the sole cor-
porate general partner] was to investigate and conceive of real estate
investment opportunities and, when it found such opportunities, to
cause the creation of limited partnerships with [itself] acting as the
general partner. [The limited partnership in question] was only one
of several limited partnerships so conceived and created. [The two
limited partners] did not form [the corporate general partner] for
the sole purpose of operating [the one limited partnership in ques-
tion]. Hence, their acts on behalf of [the corporation] were not per-
formed merely for the benefit of [the one limited partnership]81
77. Id. at 245.
78. U.P.A. § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. at 22; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.585(2) (1985).
79. U.P.A. § 2, 6 U.L.A. at 12; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.565(3) (1985).
80. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 25.08.070(2)(a) (Supp. 1982).
81. 562 P.2d at 246. The dissent more directly rejected the reasoning of the Texas court
that,
because the limited partners acted as officers of the corporate general partner, they
"were obligated to their other partners to so operate the corporation as to benefit the
partnership." 517 S.W.2d at 426. We find no inherent wrong in this. Persons in the
position of the individual defendants in this case would be bound to act in the best
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Despite this attempt to distinguish Delaney on its facts, it was
clear that the Supreme Court of Washington differed in its basic ap-
proach to the issue. Whereas Delaney sought to give substance to the
requirement of one general partner by insisting that there be mean-
ingful personal liability, the Frigidaire court felt that the concern
with minimum capitalization may arise any time a creditor deals with
a corporation. Given that a corporation may be the sole general part-
ner, "this concern about minimum capitalization, standing by itself,
does not justify a finding that the limited partners incur general lia-
bility for their control of the corporate general partner."12 The court
said that if a corporate general partner is inadequately capitalized,
creditors are protected under the "piercing-the-corporate-veil" doc-
trine of corporate law. However, when the limited partners control
the corporation only in their capacities as agents for it, and no credi-
tors are misled into thinking they are acting on their own behalf, the
Frigidaire court indicated it would respect the separate corporate ex-
istence and refuse to impose personal liability on the limited
partners. 3
B. The New Florida Act
The new Florida Act continues to suggest that a limited partner
interests of both the corporate general partner and the limited partners under the
guidelines of RCW 25.08.120. The dual capacities are not inimical as asserted.
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 544 P.2d 781, 784 (Wash. App. 1976).
82. 562 P.2d at 246.
83. A somewhat different approach was taken in Mursor Builders, Inc. v. Crown Mountain
Apt. Assocs., 467 F. Supp. 1316 (V.I. 1978). The court noted the "literal" approach of Delaney
that focused on "control" and seemed to indicate sympathy for the Frigidaire approach that
considered "creditor reliance."
However, third party reliance is not the sole criterion. Some meaning must be given
to the language embodied in [the control limitation]. I do not hold that merely by
acting as officers of a corporate general partner, limited partners become subject to
general liability. Rather, I hold that where, as herein, the corporate officers co-mingle
partnership funds with personal funds, fail to maintain complete corporate and part-
nership financial records, utilize corporate and partnership funds for their personal
enjoyment, and fail to maintain their corporate officer identity in conducting partner-
ship affairs, said limited partners become generally liable for the debts of the partner-
ship irrespective of third party creditor reliance.
Id. at 1333-34. For a discussion of early cases on the "control" limitation, including those that
discuss it in terms of "interference" with a general partner, see Basile, Limited Liability for
Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199,
1202-04 (1985). For a discussion of cases under the Original Act, see Abrams, Imposing Liabil-
ity for "Control" under Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 28 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 785, 791-802 (1978).
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can become liable by exercising too much control. Section 25(1) pro-
vides as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (4) [dealing with the im-
proper use of a limited partner's name in the partnership name], a
limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partner-
ship unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise
of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he participates in the
control of the business."'
However, further provisions that elaborate this control limitation
suggest that there may never be a case in which a limited partner will
be held personally liable simply because he exercised too much
control.
First, the new Florida Act expressly imposes a reliance require-
ment on plaintiffs who pursue the "control" route to the personal
liability of limited partners:
[I]f the limited partner participates in the control of the business,
he is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited
partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.85
This particular reliance requirement is based on the Uniform Act.86
It is very protective of limited partners because it both defines reli-
ance in terms of belief that the limited partner is a general partner
and states that the reliance must be reasonable. In essence, it is not
control per se that causes a limited partner to become liable as a
general partner; it is control that reasonably induces another to be-
lieve that the limited partner is a general partner.8 7
Second, the new Florida Act provides that participating in con-
trol does not include proposing, approving, or disapproving, by voting
84. New Florida Act § 25(1). The new Florida Act also continues the old rule that a person
may be both a general partner and a limited partner. See new Florida Act § 22:
A general partner also may make contributions to and share in profits, losses, and
distributions as a limited partner. A person who is both a general partner and a lim-
ited partner has the rights and powers, and is subject to the restrictions and liabili-
ties, of a general partner and, except as provided in the partnership agreement, also
has the powers, and is subject to the restrictions, of a limited partner to the extent of
his participation in the partnership as a limited partner.
85. New Florida Act § 25(1).
86. Uniform Act § 303(a), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.).
87. Compare Outlet Co. v. Wade, 377 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979), emphasizing the
importance of creditor reliance on the "individual credit" of the person whose liability is
sought.
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or otherwise, one or more of the following matters:
1. The dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership.
2. The sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, assignment, pledge, or
other transfer of or granting of a security interest in, any or all or
substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership.
3. The incurrence, renewal, refinancing, payment or other dis-
charge of indebtedness by the limited partnership other than in the
ordinary course of its business.
4. A change in the nature of the business.
5. The admission, removal or retention of a general partner.
6. The admission, removal or retention of a limited partner.
7. A transaction involving an actual or potential conflict of in-
terest between a general partner and the limited partnership or the
limited partners.
8. An amendment to the partnership agreement or certificate of
limited partnership.
9. A matter related to the limited partnership not otherwise
enumerated in this subsection which the partnership agreement
states in writing is subject to the approval or disapproval of limited
partners.8
This portion of the new Florida Act is based on the Uniform Act but
includes some modifications made in Delaware that expand the safe
harbor."' The references in subsection 2 to assignment and the grant-
ing of a security interest do not appear in the Uniform Act,90 nor do
the provisions in subsection 3 concerning the "renewal, refinancing,
payment or other discharge" of indebtedness.9 1 On the other hand,
unlike Delaware, the new Florida Act limits the application of sub-
section 3 to events "other than in the ordinary course of [the] busi-
ness." 92 Both Florida and Delaware expanded subsections 5 and 6 to
include reference to the "retention" of partners.9 3
Subsection 9 requires particular mention because it is an ex-
tremely broad "catch-all" safe harbor provision. Indeed it is one that
88. New Florida Act § 25(2)(g).
89. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(6), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.), with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)(b) (1985 Interim Supp.).
90. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(6)(ii), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)(b) (1985 Interim Supp.).
91. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(6)(iii), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)(c) (1985 Interim Supp.).
92. Del § 303(b)(8)(c) (1985 Interim Supp.).
93. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(6)(v)-(vi), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(8)(e)-(f) (1985 Interim Supp.).
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the partners can define with a written partnership agreement. In
short, if a written partnership agreement subjects a matter to the ap-
proval of the limited partners, they do not take part in control by
proposing, approving or disapproving it. This provision is even
broader than that contained in the Uniform Act because it embraces
any matter "related to the limited partnership" and not merely any
matter related "to the business" of the limited partnership. 4
This yeasaying, naysaying and voting safe harbor provision is in-
tended to make sure that limited partners will not lose their limited
liability if they exercise any of the broad "democracy rights" the new
Florida Act anticipates they may be given. In many cases, these vot-
ing rights are inserted at the insistence of state "Blue Sky" commis-
sioners.9 5 More basically, under the new Florida Act the partnership
agreement is the controlling document and it may give the limited
partners or any class of limited partners the right to vote on "any
matter."9 Most narrowly, this democracy rights safe harbor protects
limited partners who believe that they must take some action, per-
haps including the removal of the general partner, to help prevent
loss of their investment. However, it goes much further. In essence, it
enables limited partners to have the same kind of "say" in manage-
ment as holders of voting stock in a corporation.
Third, the new Florida Act provides that a wide range of active
participation in partnership affairs will not be deemed, singly or in
combination, to constitute participation in control. Section 25(2) pro-
vides that a limited partner does not participate in control solely by
doing one or more of the following things:
(a) Being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited
partnership or of a general partner or being an officer, director, or
shareholder of a general partner that is a corporation.
(b) Consulting with or advising a general partner with respect to
any matter, including the business of the limited partnership.
(c) Acting as surety, guarantor or endorser for the limited part-
nership or guaranteeing or assuming one or more specific obligations
of the limited partnership or providing collateral for the limited
partnership.
94. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(6)(ix), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.).
95. See generally Augustine, Fass, Lester and Robinson, The Liability of Limited Part-
ners Having Certain Statutory Voting Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Partner-
ship, 31 Bus. LAw. 2097 (1976).
96. New Florida Act § 27. This provision is more detailed than Uniform Act § 302, 6
U.L.A. at 289 (1986 Supp.).
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(d) Taking any action required or permitted by law to bring or
pursue a derivative action in the right of the limited partnership.
(e) Requesting, attending or participating in a meeting of
partners.
(f) Serving on a committee of the limited partnership or the
limited partners.97
Similarly, winding up the limited partnership pursuant to section 47,
dealing with nonjudicial dissolution, will not constitute taking part in
control,98 nor will "[e]xercising any right or power permitted to lim-
ited partners under this act and not specifically enumerated in this
subsection."99 In addition, a limited partner is not to be automati-
cally deemed to take part in control simply because he has or exer-
cises a power not listed among the safe harbor provisions. 00
Subsection (a), which is identical to the language in the Uniform
Act,1°1 clearly prevents a recurrence of Delaney. °2 It also goes much
further because it indicates a limited partner may provide continuing
services as an agent, employee or independent contractor of the part-
nership without taking part in control. This provision complements
the new rule that a limited partner can receive his interest for ser-
vices'0 3 and parallels the federal income tax rule that one can func-
tion in both partner and nonpartner capacities.10 4 Subsection (b) is
based on Delaware language that is broader than the Uniform Act
because it refers to "any matter" and not merely to "the business of"
the partnership. 0 5 Similarly, subsection (c) follows Delaware by ad-
ding reference to "providing collateral for the limited partnership.' 0 6
Subsection (d) is identical to the Uniform Act language, but sub
section (e) once again follows the lead of Delaware by adding the ref-
97. New Florida Act § 25(2).
98. New Florida Act § 25(2)(h).
99. New Florida Act § 25(2)(i).
100. New Florida Act § 25(3):
The enumeration in subsection (2) does not mean that the possession or exercise
by a limited partner of any power other than a power enumerated in that subsection
constitutes participation by him in the business of the limited partnership.
101. Uniform Act § 303(b)(1), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.).
102. See text accompanying notes 67-75, supra.
103. See text accompanying notes 38-41, supra.
104. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, as amended, § 707(a).
105. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(2), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(2) (1985 Interim Supp.).
106. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(3), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(3) (1985 Interim Supp.).
107. Uniform Act § 303(b)(4), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.).
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erence to "participating" in meetings of partners.108
The provision that has no counterpart in the Uniform Act is sub-
section (f), which states that a limited partner will not participate in
control simply by "[s]erving on a committee of the limited partner-
ship or the limited partners." 10 9 This provision appears to authorize
limited partners to serve on a committee analogous to a corporate
board of directors, which classically makes the fundamental policy
decisions of the organization. This provision is particularly significant
in the light of the fact that limited partners have seemed most vul-
nerable when they exercise authority analogous to that of corporate
board members. 1" 0 Stated somewhat differently, the expanded "active
conduct" safe harbor provisions in the new Florida Act appear to
draft away the full range of cases in which limited partners might
have been held liable simply because of taking part in control.
Overall, the scope of the safe harbor provisions is breathtaking,
particularly given that they can be combined. To emphasize: the stat-
ute provides that a limited partner does not take part in control
solely by doing "one or more" of the specified acts. Thus it appears,
for example, that a limited partner can be an employee of the part-
nership, own the corporate general partner, be a consultant to the
general partner, guarantee the partnership obligations, and serve on a
partnership "committee," all without taking part in "control." The
cumulative effect of the safe harbor provisions presumably explains
why the Uniform Act abandoned the 1976 Act concept of a participa-
tion in control "substantially the same as the exercise of the powers
of a general partner.""' In short, under the new Florida Act safe har-
108. Compare Uniform Act § 303(b)(5), 6 U.L.A. at 290 (1986 Supp.) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(4) (1985 Interim Supp.).
109. New Florida Act § 25(2)(f). For comparison, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(b)(7)
(1985 Interim Supp.).
110. See Kempin, The Problem of Control in Limited Partnership Law: An Analysis and
Recommendation, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 443, 443-44 (1985):
The conclusion drawn is that limited partners have lost limited liability and were
made personally liable only when they exercised the type of control that is theoreti-
cally exercised by the board of directors of corporations.
111. Section 303 of the 1976 Act provided, in part:
[I]f the limited partner's participation in the control of the business is not substan-
tially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only to
persons who transact business with . . . actual knowledge of his participation in
control.
The Official Comment explained:
Because of the difficulty of determining when the "control" line has been over-
stepped, it was thought it unfair to impose general partner's liability on a limited
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bor provisions, a limited partner can be much more active both in
fundamental business decisions and in day-to-day operations than
many general partners and still not run afoul of the control
limitation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite increased protection for limited partners under the new
Florida Act, litigation can be expected concerning whether particular
limited partners should be liable as general partners because they
have taken part in the control of the business. Because the new gen-
eration of limited partnership statutes provides that limited partners
can acquire their interests for services, and because many limited
partners are relatively affluent investors, limited partners who be-
come active in the business will continue to suggest themselves as
attractive defendants. In determining whether they are liable for tak-
ing part in control, courts should consider not only the reliance re-
quirement and the cumulative safe harbor provisions, but also the
long and clear path of the law to greater protection of limited
partners.
Roughly seventy years ago, the Uniform Commissioners stated
the fundamental policy assumption behind the Original Act:
No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capi-
tal of a business, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree
of control over the conduct of the business, to become bound for the
obligations of the business; provided creditors have no reason to be-
lieve at the times their credits were extended that such person was
so bound.1 2
Florida courts long ago recognized that the basic purpose of the Orig-
inal Act was "not to assist creditors, but to enable persons to invest
their money in partnerships and share in the profits without being
liable for more than the amount of money they contributed." '113 A
basic purpose of both the 1976 Act and the Uniform Act has been to
partner except to the extent that a third party had knowledge of his participation in
the control of the business.
On the other hand, in order to avoid permitting a limited partner to exercise all of
the powers of a general partner while avoiding any direct dealing with third parties,
the "is not substantially the same as" test was introduced.
6 U.L.A. at 241 (1986 Supp.). The Uniform Commissioners have not yet published their expla-
nation of the deletion of this test. See supra note 6.
112. 6 U.L.A. at 564.
113. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 166 So.2d 760, 764 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964).
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make more perfect the protection of limited partners by imposing re-
liance requirements on plaintiffs and by providing extensive "safe
harbor" provisions listing conduct that is not to be deemed taking
part in the control of the business. Florida has followed the lead of
Delaware in giving limited partners even greater protection than that
afforded by the Uniform Act. As the legislative history of the new
Florida Act suggests, most limited partnerships probably would have
been formed as corporations if the federal income tax classification of
limited partnerships and corporations were the same. Given that
shareholders can simply and without question insulate themselves
from personal liability by registering under the general incorporation
act, there is no reason why limited partners should be unable to
achieve the same result by registering under the limited partnership
act.114 A limited partner who holds himself out as a partner could
simply be held liable as a partner by estoppel.1 5
The problem is that even the very latest limited partnership
statutes, including the new Florida Act, still have not reached the
point of admitting that the emperor wears no clothes. Unable to sep-
arate themselves from their origins in a time when general incorpora-
tion statutes were unavailable, they fail to directly state that no lim-
ited partner will be subjected to personal liability unless he has held
himself out as a general partner.116 Rather, the statutes continue to
provide vaguely and with elaborate qualification that a limited part-
ner will not be personally liable "unless he participates in the control
of the business." Probably no combination of reliance and safe har-
114. See Kempin, The Problem of Control in Limited Partnership Law: An Analysis and
Recommendation, 22 Am. Bus. L.J. 443, 466 (1985):
The rule that control means liability is a product of a jurisprudence of concep-
tions that is devoid of policy considerations other than the maintenance of the dis-
tinction between incorporated and unincorporated associations and their functional
equivalents. Although the maintenance of that distinction may appeal to legal logic, it
furthers no social or economic policy and denies to business persons an alternative
form of organization that harms no one.
115. See Unif. Partnership Act § 16, 6 U.L.A. at 195; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.635 (1985). The
U.P.A. applies to limited partnerships except to the extent that the limited partnership act is
inconsistent. U.P.A. § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. at 22; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.585(2) (1985); new Florida Act
§ 70. See also Outlet Co. v. Wade, 377 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of creditor reliance on "the individual credit" of the person to be held liable).
116. Several commentators have suggested that limited partners be insulated from per-
sonal liability even if they exercise management functions. See Basile, supra note 83; Donnell,
An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 399 (1980);
Kempin, supra note 114; Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 48 FORD. L. RE.
159 (1979); and Pierce, Limited Partner Control and Liability under the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, 32 SW. L.J. 1301 (1978).
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bor provisions will ever completely eliminate the possibility of a hold-
ing that a limited partner is liable as a general partner by taking part
in control. Nevertheless, with its cumulative "active conduct" safe
harbor provisions based on Delaware modifications to the Uniform
Act, the new Florida Act appears to come very close indeed.

